Evelyn A. Muir v. Amex Life Assurance Company, A California corporation; Sandra M. Jenkins; Linda J. Muir; Virginia M. Lowe; Deanne M. Pfeiffer; and Mark W. Muir : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Evelyn A. Muir v. Amex Life Assurance Company,
A California corporation; Sandra M. Jenkins; Linda
J. Muir; Virginia M. Lowe; Deanne M. Pfeiffer; and
Mark W. Muir : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David H. Scwobe, Esq; Mark C. McLachlan, Esq; Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan; Attorneys for
Appellant.
B. Ray Zoll, Esq; Tom D. Branch, Esq; Zoll & Branch; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Muir v. Amex Life Assurance Company, No. 890342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1946
JTAH 
XOUMENT 
< f U 
>0 
AiO 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
HoM'U IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EVELYN A. MUIR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; DEANNE 
M. PFEIFFER; and MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890342-CA 
14(b) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Tom D. Branch, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
360 West 5300 South, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
David H. Schwobe, Esq. 
Mark C. McLachlan, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
FILED 
NOV 2 7 1989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EVELYN A. MUIR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; DEANNE 
M. PFEIFFER; and MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890342-CA 
14(b) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Tom D. Branch, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
360 West 5300 South, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
David H. Schwobe, Esq. 
Mark C. McLachlan, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No, 
Table of Authorities 2 
Statement of Jurisdiction 4 
Statement of the Issues 5 
Determinative Statutes and Rules 5 
Statement of the Facts 6 
Summary of Argument 9 
Argument 11 
Point 1 11 
Point II 18 
Point III 20 
Point IV 21 
Point V 23 
Point VI 24 
Conclusion 27 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Briaas v. Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985) 19 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d 708 (Utah 1977) 16 
Harris v. Harris, 616 P. 2d 1099 (Mont. 1980) 25 
Hescup v. City and County of Honolulu, 638 P. 2d 870 (Hawaii App. 
1982) 23 
Hill v. Barge. 12 Ala. 687 (1848) 20 
Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F. 2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975) . . . 24 
Leon Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 491 P. 2d 226 (Utah 1971) 24 
Little v. Sugg, 8 So. 2d 866 (Ala. 1942) 20 
Penn v. Ivey. 615 P. 2d 1 (Alaska 1980) 24 
Re Daley's Estate, 240 N. W. 342 (S. D. 1932) 20 
Re Estate of Perssion, 123 N. W. 2d 465 (Wis. 1963) 20 
Reedy v. Papst, 288 S. E. 2d 526 (W. Va. 1982) 19 
Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co.. 738 P. 2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) . . . 24 
Transamerica Occidental Life v. Burke, 368 S. E. 2d 301 (W. Va. 
1988) 17, 19 
Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold, 348 N. E. 2d 520 (111. App. . 19 
1976) 
Wvller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.. 503 F. 2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974)24 
Statutes and Rules Page No. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-24-8(3) , 5, 22 
2 
6 17 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(3) ' 
6 17 Utah Rules of Evidence 804(b)(5) ' 
Miscellaneous Page No, 
32B Am Jur 2d Federal Rules of Evidence section 270 (1982) . 17 
3 
IN THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
EVELYN A. MUIR, : 
s 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; DEANNA 
M. PFEIFFER; and MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2(a)-3(2)(j) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. This appeal is from a judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 890342-CA 
Priority 14(b) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court act properly in overruling 
Appellant's objections to hearsay statements made by the decedent 
to the respondents? 
2• Did the District Court act properly in its applica-
tion of the general principles of contract law to the interpreta-
tion of the insurance form? 
3. Did the District Court act properly in refusing to 
allow Appellant, who filled in two blanks on the insurance form, 
to testify regarding her intent in thus completing the form? 
4. Did the District Court act properly in allowing 
Decedent's bishop to testify concerning observations made by him? 
5. Did the District Court act properly in excluding 
questioning regarding any alleged hypnosis of respondent Lowe? 
6. Was the District Court's finding that the insurance 
proceeds were to be equally divided among Appellant and Respondents 
sustainable in view of the evidence presented? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann, section 78-24-8(3): Privileged communi-
cations . 
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. . . (3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the 
consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any 
confession made to him in his professional character in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(3): Hearsay exceptions: 
availability of declarant immaterial. 
. . . (3) A statement of the declarant's then existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove 
the fact remembered or believed unless it relates the execution, 
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 804(b)(5): Hearsay exceptions: 
declarant unavailable. 
. . . (b)(5) A statement not specifically covered by any 
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is an appeal by Evelyn A. Muir, Plaintiff in the 
proceedings below, from an order of judgment entered by the Third 
District Court on March 16, 1989. That order was based on the 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which are briefly 
summarized as follows: 
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Evelyn A. Muir, the appellant herein, and Wallace A. Muir 
were married on April 26, 1947. All respondents in this case are 
children of the Muirs, born to or adopted by them between 1949 and 
1964e 
By the late 1970s, the relationship between Wallace and 
Evelyn Muir had become strained to the point that Mr. Muir 
discussed openly his wish to divorce her. Unknown to Mr. Muir at 
that time was his wife's abusive treatment of their children, to 
which they had been subjected for years. The relationship between 
the children and their father, while not perfect, was good. 
Such was the situation between the parties on October 28, 
1978, when Wallace Muir enrolled in a credit union life insurance 
policy, which provided a death benefit of $31,000. About six years 
later, in response to a solicitation by the credit union, Mr. Muir 
increased the benefits under this insurance plan to $151,000. On 
the original enrollment form, in the space provided for the 
designation of beneficiaries, Evelyn, filling in the blanks as 
directed by her husband, wrotes "Evelyn-Sandra Linda Ginny Deanna 
Mark," thus separating her name from the others by the use of a 
dash. These individuals were listed as the wife "and" children of 
the insured. There was no change in the designation of benefi-
ciaries at the time the death benefit was increased. 
On September 5, 1986, Wallace Muir was killed in an 
accidental explosion. The present dispute arose over the disburse-
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ment of the insurance proceeds, with Evelyn Muir, after first 
representing to others that Mr. Muir had had no life insurance in 
force at the time of the accident, later claiming that she had been 
named as primary beneficiary and the children as secondary 
beneficiaries of the accidental-death policy here in question. The 
children contended that all beneficiaries were to share equally. 
The insurer, Amex Life Insurance Company, refused to pay the 
proceeds on the insurance policy to Evelyn unless the respondents 
first agreed to release whatever claim they might have to the 
proceeds. When two of the respondents refused to sign the 
releases, Appellant filed the present action on February 23, 1987. 
The case was tried without a jury on January 17, 18, 19, 
and 24, 1989. The trial focused primarily on the intent of Wallace 
Muir at the time the beneficiaries were designated, and the Court 
found in favor of the defendants. The Court's findings were based 
primarily on the testimony produced at trial, much of which is now 
challenged on appeal by the plaintiff. Mrs. Muir contended that 
her use of the dash on the enrollment form reflected her husband's 
wish that she become the primary beneficiary, and the children 
contingent or secondary beneficiaries. On the other hand, the 
claims of the children were buttressed by their own testimony — 
especially that of Virginia Lowe, who was present when the form was 
completed — as well as by specimens of Evelyn's handwriting, which 
demonstrated her habitual use of the dash in written communica-
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tions, even in circumstances where the rules of punctuation did not 
require it. The Court, having heard the conflicting testimony and 
weighed the credibility of all witnesses who testified in the 
matter, rejected Mrs. Muir's claims. The case is now on appeal 
from that decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not err in admitting Respond-
ents' testimony regarding their conversations with the decedent, 
wherein he informed them that they were provided for by his life 
insurance policy. Because Mr. Muir was dead, and because Mrs. Muir 
was both the scrivener for her husband and a beneficiary under the 
policy, the testimony of Respondents was as probative on the issue 
of Decedent's intent as any evidence that could be produced by Mrs. 
Muir. The appellant's self-serving testimony was not corroborated 
by other evidence. In addition, she was impeached on the witness 
stand during cross-examination; and the trial court, as the 
factfinder in this case, had the responsibility of evaluating the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony. 
Thus, it did not abuse its discretion in deciding the testimony of 
Respondents was more credible than that of Appellant, or in 
according it greater weight. 
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2. The trial court did not err, as Appellant alleges, 
in construing the insurance policy in accordance with general 
contract law rather than by applying the principles of testamentary 
construction. In fact, the trial court did both. 
3. The trial court did not err in not allowing Appellant 
to testify concerning her intent as to what the beneficiary 
designation meant. The cases cited by Appellant in her brief are 
not germane to the case now before this court, wherein the ap-
pellant was both the scrivener and a named beneficiary under the 
life insurance policy. Her position, coupled with other evidence 
indicating a failing marriage, mistreatment of her children, and 
a pattern of deception in her attempts to secure releases of 
insurance proceeds which otherwise would have gone to Respondents, 
made her testimony inherently suspect; and the Court did not abuse 
its discretion in rejecting it. 
4. The trial court properly allowed decedent's bishop 
to testify regarding certain observations he made. The clergyman's 
privilege extends only to communications of a confidential nature, 
and cannot be invoked where observations rather than communications 
are involved. 
5. The trial court did not err in excluding cross-
examination as to the effect, if any, of hypnosis on the recollect-
ions and testimony of Virginia Lowe. 
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6. The determination of the trial court was sustained 
by the evidence presented during the trial. The trier of fact is 
not obligated to give equal weight to all evidence presented, but 
may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in 
part. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, must 
defer to the findings of fact made by the trial court, except where 
the findings are clearly not based on the evidence. No such 
problem exists here, and the decision of the trial court must be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I, The trial court did not err in admitting 
hearsay testimony of the defendants 
regarding statements made by the deceased. 
In her trial brief, a major contention of Evelyn Muir, 
the plaintiff in the lower court and Appellant herein, was that 
under the circumstances then existing, hearsay statements offered 
by Appellant as to the decedent's intent were admissible. She 
maintained that "the court [was] required to consider the entire 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the 
relationship existing between the parties, and the conduct and 
communications of the insured." Trial Brief of Plaintiff, p. 2; 
R. at 216. She also noted that "[the] sole issue involved in the 
present case [was] the decedent's intent as to the distribution of 
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his insurance proceeds," and that it was "highly probable that a 
husband would discuss with his wife the husband's intent." Id. , 
pp. 3-4; R. at 217-18. The possibility that a father might also 
want to discuss his intentions with his children — particularly 
in view of the long history of child abuse brought to light during 
the trial — does not seem to have occurred to Mrs. Muir. 
In the present case, the pivotal issue was the intent of 
a deceased person as to the designation of the beneficiaries of his 
life insurance policy. Because the insured, Mr. Muir, was not 
available to testify, and because the appellant claimed that the 
beneficiary designation was ambiguous, the admission of hearsay 
evidence was unavoidable under the circumstances of this case. 
Appellant seems to argue that hearsay evidence supporting her 
viewpoint was admissible — see, for example, Trial Transcript at 
68-76 — while similar evidence supporting the contentions of her 
children was not. However, the trial judge admitted into evidence 
hearsay testimony offered by all parties, regarding their discuss-
ions with Mr. Muir; and the testimony offered by Respondents was 
at least as reliable as that offered by Mrs. Muir. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that the hearsay evidence offered by Respondents 
was admitted only after Appellant's testimony had first been 
admitted; and counsel for Appellant raised no objection at that 
time. 
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The testimony of all five respondents was consistent in 
portraying Mrs. Muir as a parsimonious shrew, essentially devoid 
of affection toward either her husband or her children. Her 
miserliness with money was described at length by several of the 
respondents. While Virginia and Sandy were teenagers living at 
home, Mrs. Muir required them to pay their own living expenses, 
including costs customarily borne by the parents of minor children; 
these included room and board, as well as expenses for such 
ordinary necessities as toothpaste, the cost of which was divided 
into thirds and assessed against each of the two teenage girls and 
one 12-year-old then living at home. (Trial transcript at 274-75, 
510. Hereafter the transcript will be designated as "T"). Evelyn 
Muir went to astonishing lengths in enforcing these exactions from 
her children; for example, she routinely prepared lists of 
everything owed by them, and if she paid for some expense with a 
check, the children would then be required to reimburse her for 
the service charge on the check, as well as for the stamp used in 
mailing it. (T. at 510, 538). Linda Muir testified of leaving 
home in 1969 at age 18 because of the stress at home, and the fact 
that Evelyn had made the cost of living at home more prohibitive 
than renting an apartment. (T. at 537). 
The reaction of Wallace Muir, upon learning of these and 
other outlays by his children, was one of shock and remorse; and 
to Linda he promised eventual reimbursement for her privations. 
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(T at 541-42). This was done through the insurance policy in 
dispute. 
None of the respondents characterized their parents as 
being affectionate or in love with each other, and some testified 
of their father's frustration with Evelyn's coldness and lethargy. 
(T. at 271, 380, 382, 422, 494, 502, 504, 544, 548). On more than 
one occasion in 1978, Wallace Muir remarked to Respondents that he 
was dissatisfied with his marriage, and would seek a divorce if he 
could, or if his religious scruples allowed it. (T. at 164, 267, 
418, 547-48). He developed the rather peculiar habit of sleeping 
in the bathtub or at the kitchen table, and explained this practice 
by describing Evelyn as a "cold fish" from whom he must get away 
in order to be able even to read a newspaper. (T. at 504). 
The relationship between Evelyn Muir and her children 
was, to say the least, not idyllic. When Virginia was married for 
the first time, she was told by her mother not to come back home. 
(T. at 300). The testimony of Evelyn herself discloses an 
acrimonious meeting between herself and the children, in which she 
was accused of having been a "rotten mother" and of having "scarred 
[the children] for life." (T. at 642-45). The record fails to 
show any similar rancor between Respondents and Wallace Muir; on 
the contrary, it does indicate that he often confided in his 
children and was close to them. (T. at 249-58, 372, 392, 428-
431) . 
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Although it might be argued that the consistent testimony 
of Respondents was self-serving and therefore inherently unreliable 
— even though Virginia had had no pretrial communications with the 
other respondents, and in fact had not seen them in years— the 
same argument may just as easily be made with respect to the 
testimony offered by Mrs. Muir. She allegedly acted as scrivener 
for her husband, completing the insurance form as he directed. She 
was also one of the named beneficiaries under the policy. The 
record shows her fixation with money to be equaled only by her 
reluctance to share it. No similar preoccupation is shown on the 
part of Respondents. While none of the parties in this case could 
be regarded as a disinterested witness, this is especially true in 
the case of Mrs. Muir, who was both the alleged scrivener and the 
only party to lay claim to the entire proceeds rather than only to 
a portion of them. The record of the trial shows that Evelyn Muir 
schemed and lied in order to obtain the insurance proceeds, by 
telling others that there was no insurance, and by her devious 
efforts to obtain releases from the respondents. (T. at 377, 549, 
551-52, 598). 
It is against this factual background that the admission 
of Respondents' hearsay testimony must be considered. The admis-
sion into evidence of hearsay statements made by the decedent to 
Respondents was permissible under the existing laws of evidence. 
Appellant cites the case of Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d 708 
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(Utah 1977), in contending that the hearsay statements of a 
decedent are generally inadmissible in the absence of independent 
corroboration of their trustworthiness. However, Carnesecca also 
noted that the so-called dead man statute in effect at the time 
must be "narrowly construed and applied strictly according to its 
terms;" that the purpose of the statute "was not to suppress truth 
but to prevent the proof of claims against an estate of a deceased 
person by false testimony;" and that it had "no application to 
those witnesses who have a mere interest in the estate when the 
controversy between them is only as to their respective rights as 
heirs." In short, the dead man statute was designed to disqualify 
"only those witnesses who have a direct interest adverse to the 
interests of a deceased person and his estate." Id. at 711. Here 
there was no assertion by a party of an interest adverse to the 
decedent or his estate, so the Carnesecca rationale does not apply. 
In addition, even if Carnesecca were applicable to this 
case, there is ample evidence to corroborate Respondents' claims. 
The testimony of all five respondents was mutually consistent, and 
supported by the insurance form itself, which listed all parties 
together, and designated them as "wife and children," rather than 
"wife, then children." 
Moreover, the hearsay testimony disputed by the Appel-
lants was admissible under no fewer than two provisions of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The first of these in Rule 803(3), which 
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creates an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of 
intent. A declaration of intent is admissible to prove a decedent 
had just such an intention. Transamerica Occidental Life v. Burke, 
368 S. E. 2d 301, 307 (W. Va, 1988). The creation of this except-
ion was based on "practical necessity," because such statements are 
often the only reliable means of proving intent, particularly where 
a question as to the identity of the beneficiaries is also in-
volved. 
The second provision is Rule 804(b)(5), which is the so-
called residual exception to the general rule prohibiting the use 
of hearsay evidence. Rule 804(b)(5) applies when the declarant is 
unavailable, and allows the court to admit a hearsay statement not 
otherwise covered by the Rule, if it is accompanied by independent 
evidence of its trustworthiness, is offered as evidence of a 
material fact, is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts, and if the administration of justice 
would best be served by admission of the evidence. A decision 
regarding the admissibility of such evidence is within the discre-
tion of the trial court. 32B Am Jur 2d Federal Rules of Evidence 
section 270 (1982). 
In the present case, the central issue was the intent of 
a deceased person as to the designation of the beneficiaries in his 
life insurance policy. Such a question is, by definition, "materi-
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al;" and aside from the document itself, which designated the "wife 
and children" as beneficiaries, the statements were more probative 
on this point than any other evidence Respondents might have 
acquired through reasonable efforts. The circumstances surrounding 
the statements themselves support their essential trustworthiness. 
It is entirely reasonable for Mr. Muir to have wanted to make 
provisions for his children, especially in view of the relationship 
between the children and Mrs. Muir, and the problems existing 
between Mrs. Muir and her husband in the months immediately prior 
to the preparation of the insurance form. Moreover, Mrs. Muir had 
a house which was paid for, in addition to which she had income 
from other sources. (T. at 463-64; deposition of Evelyn Muir, pp. 
6, 15). After a four-day trial, during which the trial court 
observed the demeanor of the witnesses and evaluated the weight and 
credibility of their testimony, the court determined that Mr. Muir 
intended to divide the proceeds equally among all of the named 
beneficiaries. The admission of the statements by the trial judge 
did not amount to an abuse of discretion, and his decision does not 
constitute reversible error. 
II, The District Court was correct in applying 
the general rules of contract construction to 
the interpretation of the enrollment form. 
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A life insurance policy is a contract. Briags v. 
Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985). However, Appellant is correct 
in her assertion that the general principles of construction of 
testamentary instruments are often applied to life insurance 
policies. The "cardinal rule" of construction "is that a court 
should give effect to the intent of the testator." Transamerica, 
supra, at 306; see also Reedv v. Papst, 288 S. E. 2d 526 (W. Va. 
1982); Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold, 348 N. E. 2d 520 (111. App. 
1976). Extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve a latent 
ambiguity in an instrument of a testamentary nature, and con-
siderable discretion is allowed to trial courts in the admission 
of such evidence. Transamerica, supra, at 306. Thus, accepting 
Appellant's argument that this case involved a latent ambiguity in 
the designation of life insurance beneficiaries, there was no error 
in the court's admission of the testimony of the plaintiff and the 
defendants in ascertaining the intent of Mr. Muir. This evidence 
was necessary in order to determine what the dash and the word 
"and" meant to the decedent. 
Contrary to the assertion made by Appellant in her brief, 
the insurance form was not construed solely according to the 
principles of contract construction. The entire focus of the four-
day trial was to determine the subjective intent of Wallace Muir 
with respect to this insurance policy. The testimony of all 
parties — Mrs. Muir and the five respondents —• was taken into 
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account in the effort to settle this question, as was the insurance 
form itself. The fact that Mr. Muir maintained other insurance 
also strengthened Respondents' position. 
With respect to Appellant's contention that the trial 
court erred in finding that the intent of the decedent was manifest 
from the express terms of the enrollment form, the fact is that the 
court made no such determination. Else why would four days of 
testimony from thirteen different witnesses be heard in this case? 
Ill, The District Court acted properly in refusing 
to allow Appellant to testify as to 
her intent in preparing the form. 
Because Evelyn Muir acted as scribe for the decedent and 
acquired a beneficial interest in the insurance proceeds, her 
testimony regarding the intent of the decedent is inherently 
suspect. It has been held that a rebuttable presumption exists 
against the validity of a will in which the draftsman is named as 
a beneficiary. Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687 (1848). The more recent 
cases hold that under such circumstances, the facts surrounding the 
purported execution of the will must be carefully scrutinized. Re 
Daley's Estate, 240 N. W. 342 (S. D. 1932); Re Estate of Perssion, 
123 N. W. 2d 465 (Wis. 1963); Little v. Sugg, 8 So. 2d 866 (Ala. 
1942). 
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The record in this case shows that the trial court 
explored, in considerable detail, the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the enrollment form in question. The relationships 
of the parties to each other, and to the decedent, were carefully 
examined. The testimony of Respondents evinced the venality of 
Mrs. Muir, as well as the desire of the decedent to compensate his 
children for their privations. The Court took all of this into 
account in rendering its decision. 
The cases cited by Appellant in support of her position 
all involve scriveners who were not also named as legatees under 
the wills drafted by them. The Evans case, upon which the 
appellant seems to rely heavily, also involved a letter of 
instructions by the decedent to her attorney, and thus presented 
less difficult problems of proof and credibility. Because a 
similar situation did not exist in the present case, and in view 
of the abundance of other evidence offered by the parties and 
admitted at trial, the Court did not err in excluding Appellant's 
self-serving testimony regarding her subjective intent as Wallace 
Muir's scrivener. Her testimony, taken as a whole, implicitly 
related to her subjective intent as scrivener. 
IV, The trial court did not err in allowing 
decedent's bishop to testify. 
Notwithstanding Appellant's objection, the District Court 
21 
admitted testimony by Richard Christenson, the decedent's bishop, 
regarding observations made by him in the course of his ecclesias-
tical duties. The bishop stated that he had observed Decedent in 
a compromising position in the company of a woman other than his 
wife, and this disputed testimony was offered by Respondents as 
evidence that the marriage between Appellant and Mrs. Muir was not 
a happy one, and to refute her denial that he had had a girlfriend. 
The issue of the quality of the Muirs' marriage was raised by 
Appellant, who testified that Mr. Muir had never engaged in an ex-
tramarital affair; that their marriage was happy; and that the 
deceased would therefore have named his wife as the sole benefi-
ciary of the policy. Now, on appeal, Appellant claims these 
observations are protected by the clergyman privilege. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-24-8(3) prohibits a clergyman 
or priest from testifying as to any confession made to him in his 
professional character. A confession is a verbal communication; 
a casual observation of a man in questionable circumstances with 
a woman other than his wife is not. Nothing in this rule prohibits 
a clergyman from testifying as to what he has observed. In this 
case, the witness merely looked into the camper shell on a pickup 
truck — an act which was not part of his ecclesiastical respons-
ibility anyway. The trial court properly excluded the bishop's 
testimony regarding his discussions with the decedent (T. at 521-
22), but likewise acted properly in allowing him to testify about 
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his own observations. It was not reversible error to admit this 
testimony, which in any event was offered for impeachment purposes 
and not as substantive evidence. 
V, The District Court did not err in excluding 
cross-examination regarding Virginia Loweys 
alleged hypnosis. 
Appellant argues that the court committed error in 
excluding questioning regarding an alleged hypnosis of Virginia 
Lowe, which Appellant sought for purposes of unfounded impeachment. 
When the objection to this questioning was sustained, Appellant's 
counsel did not proffer the testimony, or otherwise indicate what 
he was attempting to prove by it. The admission or exclusion of 
impeaching evidence is a matter resting within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and will not be overturned on appeal in the 
absence of a showing of abuse. Hescup v. City and County of 
Honolulu, 638 P. 2d 870 (Hawaii App. 1982). There was no error in 
the trial court's refusal to allow this line of questioning. 
Even if Lowe had in fact been hypnotized prior to 
testifying at trial, that fact, standing alone, would not dis-
qualify her testimony. A witness in a civil case who has undergone 
hypnosis may properly testify as to those facts or events recalled 
by him prior to or after the hypnosis. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller 
Corp., 503 F. 2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974). The Tuttle case, relied on 
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be Appellant, was a criminal case. In addition, the competency of 
a witness is determined at the time a witness is called upon to 
testify, and not by what might have been done before trial to 
refresh his memory. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F. 2d 1067 (9th 
Cir. 1975). In this case, there was ample opportunity presented 
for Appellant to cross-examine Virginia Lowe, and it is highly 
improbable that the refusal to allow questioning regarding her 
alleged hypnosis significantly affected the outcome of the case. 
VI, The decision in this case was amply 
supported by the evidence presented. 
It is a well-established principle of jurisprudence that, 
in reviewing a decision by a trial court in an action at law, the 
appellate tribunal will not overturn the original findings of fact 
if there is substantial evidence to support them. Leon Glazier & 
Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 491 P. 2d 226 (Utah 1971). Moreover, it is 
the function of the trial court, and not that of the reviewing 
court, to judge the credibility of witnesses and to weigh conflict-
ing evidence where the trial court's decision is based largely on 
oral testimony. Penn v. Ivey, 615 P. 2d 1 (Alaska 1980). When a 
verdict is challenged for insufficiency of the evidence, or as 
being contrary to the evidence, it is not the function of the 
appellate court to weigh the evidence or to pass on the credibility 
of the witnesses. Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co., 738 P. 2d 1210 (Kan. 
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1987). In a nonjury case, such matters are exclusively within the 
province of the trial court. Harris v. Harris, 616 P. 2d 1099 
(Mont. 1980). 
The record in this case provides no grounds for reversing 
the decision. Condensed into a few short sentences, the evidence 
adduced from nearly 700 pages of trial transcript provides at least 
a reasonable basis for determining the following facts: 
1. The insurance form named the "wife and children" of 
Mr. Muir as beneficiaries, without punctuating this phrase, or 
otherwise indicating that the wife and children were to be treated 
differently in the insurance distribution. (T. at 16, 370). Had 
the intent been to name the children as secondary beneficiaries, 
a designation of "wife or children" or "wife, then children" would 
have been more appropriate. 
2. The check for the final premium on this insurance was 
written out and signed by Mrs. Muir on September 2, 1986 — a mere 
four days before her husband's accidental death. (T. at 113-14). 
3. In the days immediately following the accident, Mrs. 
Muir, on more than one occasion, informed others that her husband 
had no life insurance in force at the time of his death, thus 
leaving her altogether destitute. (T. at 221, 260, 333, 463-64, 
466, 549, 553-54, 599-600). 
4. Mrs. Muir deliberately and systematically withheld 
her knowledge of the policy, and the amount of the death benefit, 
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from those who were or should have been closest to her — in-
cluding, of course, the children. She asked two of them to sign 
releases on whatever benefits they might have been entitled to 
under the policy, without informing them of their potential 
interest in the proceeds, or even of the fact that the insurer 
itself was prepared to treat the named beneficiaries equally. (T. 
at 340, 346, 377, 379, 551-54, 569-70, 623). To John Pfeiffer, on 
the day after the accident, Mrs. Muir vehemently insisted that 
there was no insurance, and that no premiums had been paid, either 
by check or by automatic withholding from a bank account; and this 
witness was impressed by the force with which these assertions were 
made, at a time when Mrs. Muir was supposedly immobilized by grief. 
(T. at 599-600, 602) . 
5. As shown in writing exemplars introduced at trial, 
Mrs. Muir habitually used dashes or hyphens in her handwriting; 
they were employed as substitutes for commas. (T. at 352-59). 
6. As pointed out in a preceding section of this brief, 
Respondents had a far better relationship with their father than 
with their mother, whose treatment of them during their formative 
years, coupled with the Muirs's strained marriage, gave him a very 
plausible reason to want to provide for the children by means of 
a death benefit. 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Mrs. Muir was 
less than honest in her dealings with respect to the insurance 
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policy; that the contract itself, with its designation of the 
parties as the "wife and children" of the deceased, supported their 
contention that all named beneficiaries were to be treated equally; 
and that the testimony of all five respondents — particularly 
Virginia Lowe — was believable, accurate, and mutually consistent. 
Stronger evidence in support of Respondents' position could have 
been offered, but was not; see, e. g., the court's refusal to allow 
Scott Quist, an insurance expert, to testify as to how his company 
would interpret the beneficiary designation in this contract. (T. 
at 297-98) . 
The court based its decision on the preponderance of the 
evidence presented to it, and declined to accept Respondents' 
argument that the applicable standard was clear and convincing 
evidence. (T. at 14). Nowhere does the appellant contend that 
this was not the correct standard of proof at the trial level; yet, 
notwithstanding the court's application of the lower standard, 
Appellant was unable to meet the burden of proof. The trial court 
alone has the right and the duty to determine the credibility of 
witnesses, and the weight of their testimony. The record on appeal 
shows that Judge Rigtrup's decision is backed by "substantial 
evidence," and there is no basis on which to overturn the Court's 
findings of fact. 
Conclusion 
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Neither the trial court's findings of fact nor its legal 
conclusions were grounded on reversible error. Respondents 
therefore respectfully submit that the decision in this case should 
be allowed to stand. 
Dated this day of November, 1989. 
ZOLL 
B.(/Ray Z o l l 
Attorney for /Respondents 
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